Product · Brand & experience research

How should the IC Group meet its customers?

One platform, three brands, and more acquisitions ahead. What the consolidators do, what our own teardowns show, and the group structure we propose testing in the UK.

Abstract

Question. Just Go, Bunk and Indie Campers compete for the same customer in London, Edinburgh and Dublin. Every acquisition re-opens the same question and we answer it ad hoc each time. What rule should decide what the customer sees?

What we found. The consolidators differ in one respect that matters: what a brand is permitted to mean — vehicle age (THL), price tier (Enterprise) or segment (Marriott). None runs a single master brand; none runs an unconnected collection. Separately, our own teardowns show that how much of the product a company owns predicts its interface more than brand personality does. We own our fleet, which points to a lean owned-fleet funnel with brands rendered inside it rather than as separate sites.

What we propose. A brand means a value level. Three levels — Premium, Core, Budget — set by a van's features first and its age second. Each brand has one home level and holds it in every market, with a bounded exception where a market has no brand at a level. Vans cascade down the levels as they age and end in RV Sales.

The ask. Greenlight a UK pilot in the three overlap cities, on the measures in §6. The structure is argued here; the operating economics and the customer-facing bet are what the pilot would test.

1The problem

Three brands, three websites, cross-visible inventory, no shared account, and no rule for the next acquisition.

Just Go and Bunk compete directly with Indie Campers in London, Edinburgh and Dublin. A customer searching any of those three cities can reach all three brands, see overlapping inventory, and find no relationship between them. Nothing in the current setup decides which brand should win that search, or what the customer is supposed to understand from seeing three of our names.

This is not only an untidiness problem. Each acquisition arrives with a name, an audience and a fleet, and each time we decide what to do with it from scratch. The acquisitions ahead are larger than the ones behind. Whatever we build now defines the slot the next one fits into, so the cost of not having a rule compounds.

What we want is one experience that competes on clarity, price range and choice, without discarding the brand equity we paid for. Those two goals pull against each other, and the tension between them is what this paper is about.

2How we researched it

Four passes: the consolidators, the interfaces, our own catalog, and two prototypes.

2.1The consolidators

We studied three groups that solved a version of this problem: Tourism Holdings (maui, Britz, Mighty), Enterprise (National, Enterprise, Alamo) and Marriott. We looked at what each brand is allowed to signify, not at how many brands each runs.

2.2Interface teardowns

Live real-browser captures of how Sixt, Marriott Bonvoy, Outdoorsy and British Airways build search, results and checkout, cross-checked against Baymard Institute usability benchmarks. We also captured how Indie Campers, Just Go and Bunk present the same three steps today.

2.3The live catalog

We reviewed the real fleet and the real prices to establish what our value levels are, rather than inventing a ladder. Customers already book a category rather than a specific van, and the fleet already sells in quality steps: Original, Standard, Plus.

2.4Prototypes

Two results-page directions, four versions in total, plus the shared offer-and-checkout page in three renderings. All built on real fleet and real prices, and interactive in the live versions.

Method note to add before circulation Dates and scope of each pass, and who ran them. A reader should be able to tell how recent the teardowns are and what was excluded.

3What the market does

3.1What a brand is permitted to mean

The three consolidators diverge on one variable. THL cascades a single fleet through three brands as it ages, so the brand tells you the vehicle's age. Enterprise runs three names at three price points on one shared operation, so the brand tells you the price. Marriott maintains around thirty brands and relies on the membership to unify them, so the brand tells you the segment.

None of the three is a single master brand, and none is a loose collection of unrelated names. But "somewhere in the middle" is not, in itself, a design. What separates them is the meaning each has assigned to a brand — and that assignment is the decision in front of us.

GroupA brand denotesWhat holds it together
THLThe vehicle's ageOne fleet cascading through three names
EnterpriseThe price pointOne shared operation beneath three names
MarriottThe segmentA membership across roughly thirty names
Sources: Tourism Holdings; Enterprise Holdings; Skift, 2025.

3.2Where the market sits

Plotting groups on two axes — how many brands, and whether a membership connects them — the vehicle-rental players all sit low on the connective axis. Multi-brand rental groups exist; multi-brand rental groups with a membership over the top do not.

A two-by-two market map. Horizontal axis: one brand to many brands. Vertical axis: no shared membership to one membership on top. Vehicle-rental players sit in the lower half; hotel and travel groups occupy the upper-right; Indie Campers is marked today in the lower-left, with its target in the empty upper-right.
Figure 1. Vehicle-rental multi-brand groups cluster in the lower half. The upper-right quadrant is occupied only by hotel and travel groups. Placements are directional, drawn from public brand architecture and loyalty programmes.

Why that quadrant is empty is worth stating as our reading rather than a finding. Hotel groups do not own the hotels, so adding a brand costs a contract. Rental groups own their fleets, so every brand costs vehicles, depots and capital. The sector is also fragmented enough that no operator has held a portfolio worth connecting. So rental groups accumulate brands and never join them.

The honest counter-reading is that the quadrant may be empty because it does not pay. Campervan rental is lower-frequency than hotel stays, so repeat loyalty is weaker and a membership has less to compound. We return to this in §7.

3.3Supply ownership predicts the interface

This is the strongest finding in our own work, because it is a mechanism rather than a comparison. Across the teardowns, one variable predicts how a company builds its funnel better than any brand positioning does: how much of the product it owns.

ModelOwnsWhat the interface spends on
Marketplace
Outdoorsy, Airbnb
Nothing; aggregates independent supplyTrust. Review scores, host badges, photo-first cards, a map beside the list. Price shown as a full-trip total, because a nightly rate means little when every van differs.
Single brand
Sixt
The whole fleetConversion. The card carries a category, an example model and a price. One decision at a time, then a pay-only step. No trust-building needed, because they can vouch for every van themselves.
Loyalty group
Marriott Bonvoy
The relationship, not the propertyCoherence. Thirty brands under one account, organised by segment, browsed as a portfolio rather than as thirty sites.
Live real-browser teardowns, cross-checked against Baymard Institute benchmarks. Full teardowns on file. We read Bonvoy here as brand architecture only, not as a pricing or points mechanic.

The less of the product a company owns, the more interface it spends on trust, and the deeper its funnel runs. "Or similar" versus a named model is not a wording choice; it signals who owns the fleet, and it can be read straight off the results card.

We own our vans. That points to a lean funnel that is clear on price early and settles every choice before a pay-only step — and, at the same time, to brands rendering inside one funnel rather than fragmenting into separate sites, which is where the legacy multi-brand groups lose.

4The group model

4.1First: why keep multiple brands at all?

Before proposing a structure for several brands, the alternative deserves a straight answer. One brand with three visible levels would be cheaper, simpler and entirely consistent with the rule in §4.4 about when a brand earns its place. If the level already carries the promise and the price, and the vans often share a chassis, and the badging has to stay simple enough to swap cheaply, then what is the second name adding?

The case for keeping them rests on three things: the acquired names carry demand we would otherwise have to buy again; they let us hold a price position the flagship cannot occupy without diluting itself; and a house of brands gives each future acquisition a slot to fit into rather than a merger to execute.

The first of those is measurable, and it is the load-bearing one.

Evidence needed — highest priority Direct traffic and branded search volume for Just Go and Bunk; repeat rate by brand; price premium achieved against comparable Indie Campers inventory. Without these, "we paid for their equity" is an assertion, and it is the assertion the entire multi-brand structure stands on. If the numbers are weak, the honest conclusion is a smaller portfolio, not a better display.

4.2Three levels, set by features then age

A van's level is set by what it has, then by how old it is. Features set the ceiling — the highest level a van can reach — and age carries it down from there over time. So a brand-new van without the premium features belongs at Core, not Premium, and the age bands below are typical rather than defining.

LevelThe poolWhat we promise
PremiumCarries the premium features, newest stock, typically up to 1–2 years. The narrowest pool of the three.The level we can be most specific about — but not a named model.
CoreThe widest pool. Holds every type of van: a new one without premium features sits beside a four-year-old one at the same price, typically 2 to 4–5 years.A floor, not a range. The category's essentials are guaranteed; the extras that lift one Core van above another — an awning, air conditioning, a private suite — depend on what Procurement buys, so they are upside and never promised.
BudgetThe oldest and simplest vans, below the Core floor. Wide to choose from, narrow in what is inside.An ordinary category promise. The surprise booking, where the model is not shown, is one option within Budget rather than the promise for the level.
Today's Original / Standard / Plus map onto Budget / Core / Premium. The ladder already exists; the levels name what we sell rather than inventing it. The Core floor is set per category.

The floor is what makes Core honest. Because the pool is genuinely mixed, "this category or similar" describes only the shape of the van. The floor describes what is guaranteed inside it, and it is the same sentence in every market.

To be set before anything ships The actual minimum spec per category. It has to be a line every Core van clears everywhere, which makes it a fleet and procurement decision, not a design one.

4.3How a van cascades

Features set the range a van can occupy; age carries it down through that range. A premium van cascades openly only as far as Core and is never listed as a named Budget option. Core's simpler vans continue to Budget. The one exception is the surprise pool, where an older premium van can sit because the customer never sees the model and simply receives more than they paid for.

The cascade ends at RV Sales. A customer who rented a van near-new can buy it at the end of its life with us — a cross-sell for the group, not a membership benefit.

Moving a van down a level is not free: transfer, days off the road, re-badging, re-registration, insurance re-rating, cross-entity transfer, and per-brand photography. Two of those we can bring down ourselves. Standardised swap-badging — a shared base, fixed panel positions, a decal that changes — keeps re-badging cheap, and photography can be reused and re-edited rather than reshot. The trade-off is that badging simple enough to swap also limits how physically different the brands can look, which is the brand question of §4.4 arriving from the operations side.

Evidence needed Cost per cascade step. The structure assumes the cascade is affordable at fleet scale; nobody has priced it. This is the first thing the pilot should establish.

4.4What each brand is for

A brand adds value when it holds a position the flagship cannot: a different price level, or a different kind of trip. It becomes noise when it duplicates us on vehicles, market and price, leaving two of our names competing for one customer. That gives a rule for each acquisition.

RoleWhenWhat happens to the name
FlagshipLarger than us, or the established name in its marketKeeps its name and leads there, alongside Indie rather than beneath it. We would not diminish it by appending "by Indie Campers". Cruise America or maui, for example.
EndorseGenuinely different, or fills a gapKeeps its name with "by Indie Campers", drawing on our trust while staying distinct. Just Go and Bunk.
AbsorbSubstantially the same as a brand we already runFolded into whichever brand fits. Where it carries a real following we migrate customers gradually rather than retire it abruptly.

Role is decided per brand, by its size and standing, and holds everywhere: a flagship is a flagship in every market, an endorsed brand stays endorsed. Role and level are independent — Cruise America would be a flagship at the value level, maui a flagship at Premium.

4.5The rule, and its one exception

The rule. A brand has one home level and keeps it in every market. Which brand fills a level can change from market to market, and even city to city, but a brand never changes its home level.

The exception. Where a market has no Premium brand, the Core brand also runs Premium — pricing premium vans as premium and keeping Premium's own promise. One brand covering two levels, not one blurred level, and not a change of home level. The same applies to Budget. Alternatively we leave the level empty, or introduce a brand for that region alone. It is a stopgap, and how far to use it is a judgement call for §8.

The cost of the rule: Indie Campers' home level is Core, permanently. Under this structure the group's own name can never sell a premium product on its own account — the exception lets it cover the demand, but not own the position. That is a real price, and it should be paid deliberately rather than discovered later.

4.6The single assumption

A group-level membership connects the brands. Bruno Eusébio's Growth Team owns it as a separate project; this paper assumes it exists and leaves the mechanics to them.

Worth stating plainly, because it affects how safely this can be backed: the structure does not depend on the membership succeeding. One platform, one product standard, the level ladder and the cascade into RV Sales all hold on their own. The membership makes the group read as one thing to a returning customer; it is not what makes the structure work.

5What it looks like built

Two directions, prototyped on the real catalog. Both run on the same platform, standard and membership; the difference is what the customer navigates first.

5.1Display 1 — product at the centre

One card per product available in the searched location, with a three-way level selector inside it. Each level tile carries its image, promise, the brand that fulfils it, price and total, and its own call to action. Version A shows every tile at once; version B discloses on tap.

Display 1 results page: eight product categories, each with Budget, Core and Premium tiles showing price, promise and the brand that fulfils it. Under the Automatic filter, many Budget tiles are greyed out with a reason, two levels show as not offered, and one product is hidden.
Figure 2. Every level priced and visible on one page, at realistic volume (eight products across three levels). Missing levels show as missing rather than being padded. Built on the live catalog and real prices. Interactive version: see it live →

Filters behave as constraints with visible costs: count pills show what a filter will cost before it is tapped, filtered tiles grey out with a reason instead of vanishing, repricing is printed explicitly, and version B recomputes its "from" price so it never lies.

5.2Display 2 — brand at the centre

Shelves organised by the kind of trip, each title a level promise in lifestyle language with the auditable spec printed beside it, and the brands masked into the shelf as the names that fulfil it. Version B goes further and lists the brands themselves, hotel-group style, with model selection deferred to the brand's offer page.

Display 2 brand-led results: one card per brand (Just Go, Indie Campers, Bunk) with image, rating and the products available for the search shown as from-prices; further detail and model choice happen on the brand's own offer page.
Figure 3. The same options as Figure 2, pivoted by shelf and brand. A "compare all options" control reassembles the full price ladder in one tap. Interactive version: see it live →

The case for it: we bought Just Go and Bunk partly for their audiences, and a flat product grid discards that. First-time campervanners tend to shop by the kind of trip they want rather than by specification, and every future acquisition slots in as another experience rather than another logo to reconcile. The honest risk is that the price ladder is split across shelves, and that version B adds a step for anyone comparing prices in the overlap cities — worse under the §4.5 exception, where the same brand can appear twice at two prices.

5.3The shared step

Both directions land on the same page: offer and checkout merged, so payment is isolated to payment. Shown in three renderings — one canvas, a guided wizard, a configurator — as evidence the merge is achievable and not an irreversible commitment. It is not a decision for now.

The merged offer-and-checkout page: the selected model with its specifications on the left, and a live summary on the right that reprices as options are chosen, ending in a single pay step.
Figure 4. Offer and checkout merged, with a live summary that reprices as you choose and a pay-only final step. Interactive version: see it live →

5.4Our recommendation, and how we would learn

Start with Display 1. It matches how customers choose today, needs no extra step to compare, and handles the §4.5 exception cleanly — when one brand sells at two levels, the level does the talking and the badge rides along.

Evidence needed — this carries the recommendation The claim that our customers are price-led. It is the established internal read from booking behaviour, but it is currently the only load-bearing claim in this paper without a source attached, while far less important claims are cited. It needs a figure, a source and a date. The filter data does not support it either way — people open filters, often apply nothing, and clear them when they do — so better filters are an opportunity rather than evidence.

The measurement plan needs one correction. The compare-pivot is a Display 2 control: it exists to reassemble the ladder from shelves. If we build Display 1 first, there is nothing to pivot from, so it cannot be our measure of brand-attached demand. On a Display 1 page the equivalent signals are brand filter usage, entries arriving via the brand sites and where they convert, and the share of sessions that engage the brand dropdown at all. If we want the compare-pivot itself as a measure, Display 2 has to run somewhere — which is a second, later decision.

6If we commit

6.1The pilot

The UK, and within it the three cities where all three brands overlap: London, Edinburgh and Dublin. The hardest case is the truest test. Before a customer sees anything, three things have to be settled: the level definitions, the Core floor per category, and the results page.

Three workstreams sit outside product and need owners now. The acquired brands' sites and search equity are an asset to preserve rather than redirect away, and each brand's paid accounts carry their own history. Cross-entity vehicle transfers, per-market brand and endorsement use, and data sharing across the group need legal clearance. And a swappable badging system — common wrap base, fixed panel positions, replaceable decals — belongs with fleet ops; it is flagged here, not taken on.

6.2How we would know it worked

Measures to agree and baseline before launch, not after, on roughly a one-year horizon. The overlap cities are a small sample and earlier reads will be noise.

MeasureWhat it tells us
Search-to-booking conversion in the overlap citiesAgainst those same cities today.
Share of bookings where the customer saw more than one of our brandsWhether the group reads as one range or three funnels.
Repeat customers booking a different brand, and the booking mix across levelsA Premium level that barely sells means the ladder is not earning its keep.
Traffic via the acquired brands' own sites, and its conversionWhether the equity we paid for still works.
Average booking valueWhether the ladder quietly became a discount.
Complaints about which van turned upThe direct test of whether the Core floor is a real promise.
Cost per cascade stepWhether the fleet movement the model assumes is affordable.
Several of these need instrumentation that may not exist yet — cross-brand session tracking in particular. To confirm with analytics before the list is agreed.

7Limitations

What this paper does not establish, and what would change our view.

The customer-facing bet is untested. No customer has seen either display. The prototypes demonstrate that the structure can be built; they are not evidence that it converts better than three separate sites. Everything in §5 is a hypothesis with a test attached, not a finding.

The consolidators are analogy, not proof. THL, Enterprise and Marriott show what is possible in adjacent industries. They do not establish what works for a campervan business with our fleet, our frequency and our markets. They generated the hypothesis; they cannot confirm it.

Frequency may not support a connective layer. Campervan rental is lower-frequency than hotel stays, so a membership has less to compound. Our reading is that the layer pays off by holding the portfolio together and cross-selling the ventures rather than through repeat rental, but that is the Growth Team's thesis to prove, not ours.

The economics are unpriced. Cascade cost per step, level pricing and resale recovery are all assumed workable. This paper commits a structure, not a set of numbers.

Two sources are thinner than the weight put on them. The FTC paper on hotel brand cannibalisation is a working paper, and the HOTELSMag piece is trade commentary. Both are cited as illustration below, and neither should be read as settling the question.

What would change our view. If branded demand for Just Go and Bunk turns out to be small (§4.1), the honest conclusion is a smaller portfolio rather than a better display. If cascade cost per step is high relative to the price gap between levels, the ladder does not pay and the levels should be fewer.

8The decision

What we are asking for

Greenlight a UK pilot in the three overlap cities, built on this structure: one connected group, three levels set by features then age, each brand holding one role and one home level, a Core floor, and the fleet cascading into RV Sales.

Two judgement calls sit inside that and belong to you, not to us. First, the default where a region has no brand at a level — cover it with Core, leave it empty, or acquire one even for a single city. Second, how long the Core exception is allowed to run before a level is filled properly. Both are capital and M&A calls.

Backing the pilot is not backing the display. Display 1 is our recommendation and the reasoning is in §5.4, but that decision can wait until the structure is settled and the price-led read is properly sourced.

9Sources

  1. Tourism Holdings — maui / Britz / Mighty fleet-age cascade. Cited in §3.1.
  2. Enterprise Holdings — National / Enterprise / Alamo on one shared operation. Cited in §3.1.
  3. Skift, 2025 — Marriott brand portfolio and segmentation, approximately 30 brands. Cited in §3.1, §3.3.
  4. Accor — 45+ brand portfolio. Context for §3.2.
  5. HOTELSMag — "differentiation, not addition". Trade commentary; illustrative only, see §7.
  6. US Federal Trade Commission working paper, 2011 — brand cannibalisation in hotels. Working paper; illustrative only, see §7.
  7. Live real-browser teardowns of Sixt, Marriott Bonvoy, Outdoorsy and British Airways, cross-checked against Baymard Institute usability benchmarks. Full teardowns on file. Cited in §3.3.
  8. Indie Campers live catalog and price list, August 2026. Cited in §2.3, §4.2.
  9. Internal booking behaviour analysis — source and date to be added, see §5.4.
  10. Internal brand demand data for Just Go and Bunk — to be produced, see §4.1.

maui (THL) and Cruise America are acquisition intents, not owned assets. Supporting material — two research passes, the four-lens stress test, the naming pre-screen and the full teardowns — on file.